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We consider a model that provides insight into the well-known Folk theorem in economics
that when the discount factorβ is sufficiently close to 1, expropriation will never occur.
Although this Folk theorem is true in our model, our perspective is different. The discount
factorβ often is described as a “deep structural parameter” that is difficult to alter at a
point in time. In contrast, we analyze the determinants of two thresholdsβ andβ∗ that
segment the unit interval on whichβ is defined into three subintervals. These subintervals
correspond to the three possible equilibria for investment flows: autarky, underinvestment,
and unconstrained optimal investment. These thresholds are of interest because they can
be altered by specific policy interventions. As a consequence, even ifβ is small, some
level of foreign investment can be supported. We construct measures ofβ for 40 countries,
characterizeβ andβ∗, and discuss recent trends in investment flows.
Keywords: Intertemporal Enforcement, Foreign Investment, Discount Factor
1. INTRODUCTION
In a seminal paper, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) showed that underinvestment might
occur when foreign capital is subject to endogenous expropriation risk.1 They fo-
cused on settings in which borrowers simply may choose not to repay their debt.
Rational investors anticipate this, which imposes a repayment incentive constraint
on the optimal contracting problem that causes investment to fall short of the un-
constrained optimal level. We focus on the implications of this “pure enforceability
problem,” where underinvestment occurs because of an unwillingness, rather than
an inability, to pay. Because there is no supranational legal authority that can
enforce contracts across borders, the “tightness” of the incentive constraint can
be quite severe in an international setting. North (1990, p. 54) argues that “the
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inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is
the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary under
development in the Third World.”
We consider a model of investment when enforcement is imperfect. The paper2
(i) characterizes the determinants of a country’s discount factorβ;
(ii) characterizes when unconstrained foreign investment, underinvestment, and no for-
eign investment will occur by constructing two thresholds on the unit interval; and
(iii) characterizes the determinants of the incentive constraint.
The results show that a country’s investment problem can be reduced to a com-
parison between the country’s discount factorβ and an interval with three regions
that correspond to autarky, underinvestment, and unconstrained investment. These
intervals are determined by critical thresholdsβ andβ∗ that we construct. Further,
we show that, when enforcement is imperfect, country-specific factors are crucial
determinants of investment flows. This differs from the case of perfect enforcement
in which the interest rate alone is sufficient.
The model consists of a host country whose firms finance projects by borrowing
from abroad at an interest rate determined by competitive world markets. Projects
are operated in the host country (i.e., foreign investors do not control projects)
and domestic firms are unable to credibly commit to honor investment agree-
ments. As a consequence, the Pareto-efficient investment plan must be time con-
sistent. When this constraint binds, the optimal investment plan need not equate
the marginal product of capital to its return. Section 2 specifies the model and
equilibria and analyzes the incentive constraint. Section 3 contains some facts
about private market investment flows that motivate the analysis. Finally, Section 4
concludes.
2. THE MODEL AND EQUILIBRIA
Consider an economy with an infinite time horizon and agents of two types: do-
mestic and foreign. Domestic agents are identical and have a common risk-neutral
utility function.3 The domestic country has access to a constant returns to scale
production functionF(·), which requires two inputs, labor and capital. Letf (·)
denote output per capita, which satisfies the Inada conditions. Labor is provided
inelastically by domestic residents. Risk-neutral foreign agents provide capital
to supplement domestic capital and earn a competitive return given by the gross
world interest rater , which we assume is constant over time. Letk, k f , andkd be
the aggregate, foreign, and domestic capital stock per capita, respectively. Assume
that capital depreciates completely, that the domestic capital stock is constant, and
that the foreign capital stock is elastic (i.e., we consider a small open economy).
Assume further that the country’s domestic capital stock is less than the optimal
capital stock. The domestic country does not invest abroad, and its capital stock
neither depreciates nor can be augmented. As a consequence, the country’s current
output net of interest payments is consumed in the current period.
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The host country chooses an investment plan to maximize the present discounted





with 0 < β < 1 andyt = f (kt ) − r (kt − kd). As is standard [cf., Yaari (1965)],
β is the discount factor withβ = θρ, whereθ is the probability of survival, an
idiosyncratic factor that reflects the “patience” of decision makers in a particular
country, andρ = 1/r is the common pure discount factor determined by the world
market. As the world interest rate rises,β falls, indicating that all countries value
the future less highly. In contrast, asθ falls, the country-specificβ falls, indicating
that the country behaves as if it has become more myopic. Following Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 439),θ can be interpreted as a measure of country-specific
risk.4
The host country faces a stationary problem; thus the optimal investment plan
is time invariant. In any periodt , the host has the option to renege on foreign-
investment agreements. The consequence of this action is that the host loses access
to international capital markets in subsequent periods. If default occurs in any
period t , for all future periodss > t , foreign investors abstain from the market
(i.e.,ks = kd andk fs = 0). Clearly, the need for international capital provides some
incentive for borrowers to honor investment agreements in intertemporal problems,
and the host will expropriate only if the gain exceeds the cost. Because countries
that expropriate eventually return to world capital markets, the punishment of
complete exclusion in the future may seem severe. We show that when agents
discount the future highly, however, even this severe punishment is not strong
enough to deter default.
We now analyze the incentive constraint. The discounted present value from
reneging on an agreement in periodt and remaining autarkic thereafter is given by
B(kt ) = f (kt )+
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t ys = f (k)+ β
1− β f (k
d).
The discounted present value of not reneging on an agreement in periodt and













1− β [ f (k)−r (k−k
d)].
As a consequence of stationarity,B(k) andG(k) are time invariant.
The problem solved by a benevolent social planner now can be specified. The
planner chooses a stationary level of aggregate investmentk to maximizeW(k)
subject to a repayment incentive constraint that ensures that the host will honor
investment agreements, wherekd is given andk = kd + k f .
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Problem 1. Choosek to maximize
W(k) = 1
1− β [ f (k)− r (k− k
d)]
subject to
B(k) ≤ G(k), ∀k. (1)
The host maximizes the discounted utility of output subject to incentive constraint
(1). When (1) holds, contracts are self-enforcing. Letλbe the Lagrangian multiplier
on (1). The first-order conditions areB(k) = G(k) and
f ′(k)− r = rλ(1− β)
1+ λβ . (2)
Define the right-hand side of (2) byÄ(β, λ, r ) = rλ(1−β)1+ λβ , whereÄ is the wedge
between the marginal product of capital and the return on capital, which is the ef-
ficiency loss due to inadequate contractual enforcement. When enforcement is im-
perfect and (1) binds, this causesλ > 0, and the well-known underinvestment result
follows immediately. We focus on the determinants of this inefficiency when en-
forcement is imperfect. Clearly, it is desirable forÄ(β, λ, r )→ 0, which occurs as
(i) β → 1: There is less inefficiency when agents care more about the future.
(ii) r → 0: Low interest rates reduce inefficiency.
(iii) λ→ 0: There is less inefficiency when the constraint is weak.
We begin by characterizing the solutions to Problem 1, which are described by
one of three cases. Letk∗u denote the optimal capital sequence when (1) doesnot
bind (the unconstrained optimal plan) andk∗c denote the plan when (1) binds (the
constrained optimal plan). Then:
Case 1. WhenB(k) > G(k) for all k > kd, the constraint set is empty and no
foreign investment occurs.
Case 2. When the constraint binds (i.e.,λ > 0), f ′(k) > r andk = k∗c is the
optimal investment plan.
Case 3. When the constraint does not bind (i.e.,λ = 0), f ′(k) = r andk = k∗u
is the optimal investment plan.
In Case 1, the benefit from expropriation exceeds the gain from not expropriating
for all levels of investment. As a result, the host always will expropriate. Foreign
investors realize the incentive for the host to expropriate; hence, in equilibrium,
no foreign investment occurs. In Case 2, the constraint binds and this leads to
underinvestment relative to the unconstrained optimal plan (i.e., Case 3). Under-
investment is optimal, given that (1) binds, as this is a version of Kydland and
Prescott’s (1977) time-consistency result: The constrained equilibrium is Pareto
inferior relative to the unconstrained equilibrium, where there is full commitment
to the ex-ante optimal plan. The problem is that no “commitment technology”
DISCOUNT FACTORS AND THRESHOLDS 5
FIGURE 1. Case 1: Autarky equilibrium.
exists that can induce agents to adhere to the “first best” intertemporal plan ex post
[cf., Krasa and Villamil (2000)].
When there is no supranational legal authority (e.g., court) that can enforce
contracts across borders, contracts must be self-enforcing. As in Atkeson (1991),
Eaton (1993), and Thomas and Worrall (1994), a contract is self-enforcing if it is
incentive compatible for the agent to honor prior commitments (i.e., tono expro-
priate). The set of self-enforcing investment plans in our model is characterized as
follows: First note thatB′(k) = f ′(k) > 0 andB′′(k) < 0. Further,G′(k∗u) = 0
andG′′(k) < 0. As a consequence,k∗u maximizesG(k). Also note thatG(k) and
B(k) intersect atkd. Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the three possible cases of the
solution to Problem 1.
Given the self-enforcing interval,
(i) if k∗u ∈ [kd, k̄], then (1) does not bind andk∗u is optimal;
(ii) if k∗u 6∈ [kd, k̄], then (1) binds,B(k) = G(k), andk∗c = k̄ is the maximum investment
level for whichk is self-enforcing.
The upper bound of the interval,k̄ can be interpreted as a debt ceiling. Ifk∗u > k̄,
the country faces a borrowing constraint. Ifk∗u ≤ k̄, the country can borrow as
much as it desires.
Finally, it is evident in Problem 1 that the host country’s discounted utility (i.e.,
welfare) depends on its domestic capital stock,kd, and its idiosyncratic discount
factorβ = θ/r , regardless of whether enforcement is a problem. When enforce-
ment is a problem, however, country-specific characteristicskd andβ(θ, r ) play
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FIGURE 2. Case 2: Constrained optimal equilibrium.
FIGURE 3. Case 3: Unconstrained optimal equilibrium.
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an additional role: They determine, in conjunction withr , a country’s ability to
attract foreign capital,k f . In contrast, when enforcement is perfect,r is sufficient
to determine capital flows, and each country receives the unconstrained optimal
level of investment,k∗u. This is a crucial observation, which motivates the analysis
that follows. We now show how the optimal investment plan is affected by these
“fundamentals,” and constructθ andβ(θ, r ) for 40 countries.
2.1. Threshold Discount Factors
In this section we show that the solutions to Problem 1 can be characterized
completely by restrictions on the discount factor that segment the unit interval into
the three cases. The equilibrium then is determined completely by a comparison
of β and the relevant case on the unit interval. It follows fromB(k) ≤ G(k) that




f (k)− f (kd) ≤ β < 1. (3)
Define two critical thresholds on the unit interval (0, 1) by
β∗, the minimum discount factor for which plank∗u is self-enforcing; and
β, the minimum discount factor required to attract foreign investment.
Proposition 1 shows that these thresholdsβ andβ∗ segment the unit interval into
three subintervals, which correspond to Cases 1, 2, and 3 such that 0<β <β∗< 1.
A foreign agent’s investment decision is thus effectively a comparison of the host
country’s idiosyncraticβ(θ, r ) and the relevant subinterval: Case 1 prevails when
β ∈ (0,β), Case 2 prevails whenβ ∈ [β, β∗), and Case 3 prevails whenβ ∈ [β∗, 1).
PROPOSITION 1.The threshold discount factorsβ, β∗ ∈ (0, 1) are critical
determinants of the solution withβ < β∗ such that
Case1. For β(θ, r ) ∈ (0,β), there is no foreign investment(autarky).
Case2. For β(θ, r ) ∈ [β, β∗) investment is constrained optimal(k∗c).
Case3. For β(θ, r ) ∈ [β∗, 1), investment is unconstrained optimal(k∗u).
We define a country’s discount factorβ(θ, r ) as “low” if it is in the Case-1 inter-
val, “moderate” if it is in the Case-2 interval, and “high” if it is in the Case-3 interval.
The three possible outcomes in Proposition 1 are depicted clearly in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4. Possible outcomes of Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 indicates that countries with low discount factors will have dif-
ficulty attracting foreign investment. Recall thatβ = θ/r , where 1/r is the pure
(market) discount factor andθ is the probability of survival. By linking the discount
factorβ to the country-specificθ , Proposition 1 provides a plausible explanation
for the inability of some countries to attract foreign investment. Whenβ(θ, r )
is very low, the country is more likely to be in the low Case-1 equilibrium with
β(θ, r ) ∈ (0,β). Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1995, p. 440) and Mauro’s (1995)
empirical results indicate that effective legal and political institutions are statis-
tically significant for explaining growth. These results are consistent with the
model. Effective institutions tend to raiseβ(θ, r ), thus increasing the likelihood
that a country is in Case 2 or 3. As a consequence, the country will be able to
sustain some level of foreign investment. Similarly, it is well known that stability
is correlated with successful development and that instability is associated with
“growth disasters” [cf., Parente and Prescott (1986)]. This result is also consistent
with the predictions of the model. Figure 5 illustrates clearly the impact thatβ s
on private foreign investment flows.
Proposition 1 and Figure 5 indicate that, when agents discount the future highly,
the threat of permanent and complete exclusion from international capital markets
is not sufficient to deter default. Rational investors anticipate this problem and, as
a result, no foreign investment occurs. For moderate levels of the discount factor,
the threat of permanent exclusion can sustain some amount of investment. Thus,
Proposition 1 reconciles the apparently contradictory results of Cohen (1991) and
Eaton (1993). Cohen (p. 94) argues that the threat of complete financial autarky is
never enough to prevent default. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) obtain a similar result
when the punishment is partial financial autarky. We arrive at a similar conclusion
for Case 1, whereβ ∈ (0,β). In contrast, Eaton (1993), on the basis of a model
where agents borrow for consumption smoothing, concludes that maintaining ac-
cess to credit markets is a sufficient reason to honor contracts. This is consistent
with our results for Case 2, whereβ ∈ [β, β∗). Thus both results are consistent
with our model in theory. Givenβ andβ∗, the empirically relevant case will be
determined by the magnitude ofβ. We consider this issue in the next section.
Finally, note that our model provides some insights into the well-known Folk
theorem that, forβ sufficiently close to 1, expropriation will never occur [cf.,
Chari and Kehoe (1990)]. Although this Folk theorem is true in our model, our
perspective is different. Specifically,β(θ, r )often is described as a “deep structural
parameter” that is difficult to alter at a point in time. In contrast, in the next section,
we analyze the determinants of the thresholdsβ andβ∗, and hence the length of the
subintervals in Figure 4. We show that these thresholds can be altered by specific
policy interventions. As a consequence, the Case 2 and 3 intervals in Figure 4
can be made bigger. When this type of policy intervention is possible, then even
if β(θ, r ) is small, some level of foreign investment may be supported. Further,
because Figure 5 indicates that the level of private foreign investment increases
exponentially in Case 2, changes inβ on this interval can lead to volatility in
investment flows.
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2.2. Calibration
In Table 1, we present estimates ofθ andβ for 40 countries. The estimate forθ is
constructed from five risk indicators, averaged over the period 1990–1995 using
data from theInternational Country Risk Guide.5 The risk indicators evaluate
contract repudiation, expropriation risk, government corruption, the rule of law,
and the quality of the bureaucracy. We use the average of the five indicators to
constructθ and user = 1.05 to constructβ. Table 1 documents the wide variation
in θ , and henceβ, for these countries. Indeed,β varies from a high of 0.95 to
a low of 0.23. In contrast, whenβ = 1/r , a frequent calibration in many real
business-cycle models,β = 0.95 is the common discount factor for all countries.6
Table 2 provides data on loans to 24 low- and medium-β countries over the
period 1989–1996. One of the striking features of the data is the strong associ-
ation between the estimated discount factor and private foreign investment. This
relationship is depicted clearly in Figure 6, the scatter plot of the share of foreign
investment provided by private entities versus the discount factor, which follows
Table 2. The correlation coefficient for the two variables is quite high (0.77) and is
significant at 5%. Furthermore, five of the countries, namely, Burkina Faso, Congo,
Haiti, Swaziland, and Togo, are in the autarky (Case 1) equilibrium, and did not
receive any private foreign investment. Note that the average estimated discount
factor for these countries is quite low, equaling 0.39. These results are an indication
of the importance of the magnitude ofβ for determining private investment flows.
2.3. Comparative Statics
We now consider how changes in “fundamentals” affect the length of each of the
subintervals in Figure 4. We first ask how changes in a country’s domestic capital
stockkd and the world interest rater affectβ andβ∗. From the proof of Proposition
1 (in the Appendix), the threshold discount factors are determined bykd andr ,
and are given by
β(kd, r ) = r
f ′(kd)
, (4)







)− f (kd) . (5)















Part (a) indicates that capital-poor countries have relatively lower threshold
discount factors than countries with large domestic capital stocks. This result may
seem odd at first glance. However, a low domestic capital stock implies that most of
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TABLE 2. Loan information for selected low- and medium-β countriesa
Terms of new loan commitments (averaged 1989–1996)
Official Private
Discount % of Total Interest % of Total Interest
Country factor,β loansb rate loansc rate
Argentina 0.62 43 6.99 57 7.99
Bangladesh 0.36 95 1.16 5 3.78
Brazil 0.67 40 6.99 60 8.48
Burkina Faso 0.47 100 1.27 0 NA
Cameroon 0.55 93 4.29 7 7.83
Chile 0.65 68 6.13 32 7.00
China 0.66 33 5.44 67 7.03
Colombia 0.57 39 7.03 61 7.98
Congo 0.42 100 5.36 0 NA
Ghana 0.59 81 1.73 19 7.20
Haiti 0.23 100 1.42 0 NA
India 0.58 67 3.88 33 7.14
Indonesia 0.62 69 5.29 31 6.76
Malaysia 0.61 21 5.47 79 7.00
Mexico 0.67 37 7.58 63 7.34
Niger 0.43 82 1.64 18 12.20
Nigeria 0.47 82 5.58 18 7.78
Peru 0.49 97 6.16 3 6.85
Philippines 0.46 64 5.08 32 6.53
Russia NA 72 6.46 28 7.44
Sierra Leone 0.32 98 1.26 2 7.95
Swaziland NA 100 4.83 0 NA
Togo 0.43 100 0.90 0 NA
Zambia 0.42 89 1.84 11 8.38
aAll data were obtained from the Global Development Finance [cf., World Bank (1998a)].
bOfficial loans include multilateral and bilateral loans.
cPrivate loans include bonds, commercial banks, and other private creditors.
the host country’s production is financed by foreign investment. As a consequence,
foreign investment is relatively essential. Indeed, the plausible intuition for the
result is that, when foreign investment is relatively essential, a forward-looking
host will not expropriate even when it values the future in only a limited way.
This intuition is reminiscent of Alexander Hamilton’s views on sovereign debt.
He claimed that in order for governments to honor their debt they must have a
“commonality of interest” with debt holders [cf., Smith and Villamil (1998)]. A
similar argument applies in this case. If the host country and foreign investors have
a commonality of interest because foreign investment is essential, the host will not
expropriate even when it cares about the future only in a limited way. When it
is not essential (i.e.,kd is high), the threshold discount factors are high and this
makes it more difficult to attractk f .
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An important question arises from this comparative static result: If poor countries
require relatively small discount factors to attract foreign investment, why are most
poor countries, such as countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, unable to attract foreign
investment? The answer in our model is that the country-specific discount factors
of these countries,β(θ, r ), are lower than the critical thresholdβ, perhaps because
their idiosyncratic survival probabilitiesθ are low. That is, these countries do not
achieve the threshold required to attract foreign investment becauseβ(θ, r ) < β.
Our results suggest that a need for foreign capital in the future can have good
incentive effects, but a minimum threshold must be attained before this effect is
operative. Put differently,β need not necessarily tend to 1 as in the Folk theorem,
but it must at least attainβ.
The resultdβ/dr > 0 in part (b) implies that, when the world interest rate rises,
more countries will revert to the autarky equilibrium because higher world interest
rates literally “raise the bar”β for these countries to attract foreign investment. In
contrast, the sign ofdβ∗/dr is ambiguous. Whendβ∗/dr > 0, an increase in the
world interest rate depresses international capital flows because it increases the
Case 2 interval. This is undesirable because it shrinks the Case 3 interval where
the unconstrained optimal level of investment occurs. However,dβ∗/dr < 0 is
problematic as well. Althoughβ∗ decreases, and this is a “good” effect because
it lengthens the Case 3 interval, the country-specific discount factorβ(θ, r ) de-
creases, which impedes private investment. The net effect on private investment is
unclear when bothβ(θ, r ) and the lengths of the intervals change.
We now explore factors that affect the incentive constraint (i.e., factors that tend
to tighten or loosen the constraint, ceteris paribus). We begin by noting that when






)− f (kd)]− r (k∗c − kd) = 0. (6)
We use (6) to obtain a series of comparative static results. These results characterize
how the constrained optimal investment plank∗c changes when there are changes
in the level of the domestic capital stockkd, the country-specific discount factor
β(θ, r ), and the world interest rater . These results are summarized in Claim 2.














First suppose that the country can affect the domestic capital stockkd, for exam-
ple, via policies designed to increase savings. Claim 2(a) indicates that when equa-
tion (1) binds, an increase in the domestic capital stock decreases the constrained
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optimal level of investment by crowding out foreign investment more than one for
one. This occurs because an increase inkd i creases the host’s incentive to default
(i.e., tightens the constraint) because foreign investment is less essential. Foreign
investors, realizing this, reduce their investment further, causing a decrease in the
total amount of investment.
Now suppose that the country can affectβ, for example, via measures that
improve one or more of the five risk factors in Table 1. Claim 2(b) indicates that
when equation (1) binds, an increase in the country-specific discount factorβ(θ, r )
leads to an increase in the constrained optimal level of investment. If the host values
the future more highly, then the host is less likely to default. This weakens (1) and
allows for better outcomes because we effectively differentiate with respect toθ
for a givenr .
Now consider the effect of a change in the world interest rate on the constrained
optimal level of investment, whereis exogenous to all agents. Claim 2(c) shows
that when equation (1) binds, an increase in the world interest rate leads to a
decrease in the constrained level of investment. This result is not surprising, but
the means by which it occurs differs from the standard argument. As the interest rate
rises in our model, the net gain to the host from default increases. This tightens the
incentive constraint and depresses foreign investment. Because domestic capital
is fixed, total investment falls.
One explanation for the surge in capital flows to developing countries in this
decade is that inflows are “pushed” by prevailing conditions in industrialized coun-
tries, especially low interest rates. Some predict that an increase in the world in-
terest rate will result in a reversal of these massive capital flows, causing a “capital
crunch” in developing countries. This explanation is based on two assumptions:
(i) investment is driven solely by higher returns, and (ii) capital is scarce. In con-
trast, if increased investment in developing countries does not significantly affect
the capital stock in the rest of the world,7 then our model provides an alternative
explanation for the decrease in foreign investment when world interest rates are
high. High interest rates reduce national income and therefore increase the net
gain from expropriation when enforcement of contracts is inadequate. Using a
willingness-to-pay Probit model, Lee (1991) finds that the probability that a coun-
try will default increases with the interest rate (based on data from 75 developing
countries during 1970–1985). This finding is consistent with our model. Rational
investors anticipate the increase in expropriation risk [i.e., the tightness of (1)] and
therefore invest less.
The increase in expropriation risk that results from high interest rates also pro-
vides a plausible explanation for the differential default rates observed during
the 1980s. During that period, tight monetary policies in industrialized countries
caused interest rates to soar. The default rates were highest among countries whose
external debt was owed to private investors such as commercial banks. Relatively
lower default rates were observed for countries that relied on official sources
for investment, notably the World Bank and IMF. Lee (1993) shows that dur-
ing the period 1979–1987, the default probability was higher for countries from
Latin America and the Caribbean who owed a substantial portion of their debt to
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private investors than for poor African countries, whose external debt was owed
mainly to multilateral and bilateral institutions. Loans from official sources gener-
ally carry below-market rates; hence this provides a plausible explanation for the
lower default rates. See Table 2 for data on the interest rates charged on official
loans.
Finally, another implication of claim 2(c) is that, when private investment is
subject to expropriation risk, luring investors with high returns may be dangerous.
High returns increase the net gain from expropriation, which in turn results in a
decline in investment. Thus, as intuition would suggest, our model shows that high
returns alone are not enough to induce foreign investment in a country with a high
level of expropriation risk.
3. PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT: STYLIZED FACTS
In this section we summarize some stylized facts about private foreign investment
that motivate our analysis. Private foreign investment can be decomposed into two
components, foreign direct investment (FDI) and indirect foreign investment (IFI).
FDI is investment made to acquire a management interest (usually 10% of voting
stock) in a foreign enterprise. In contrast, IFI investors hold debt or own less than
10% equity in projects that are operated by the government or a private entity in
the host country. IFI includes commercial bank loans, bonds, and portfolio equity
flows. Thus, FDI involves “control rights” but IFI does not [cf., Aghion and Bolton
(1992)]. Our model focuses on IFI, and is consistent with the following stylized
facts.
1. IFI is an important source of finance to developing countries:IFI to developing
countries has increased from $18.2 billion in 1990 (18% of total foreign investment)
to $128 billion in 1996 (45% of total foreign investment).
2. IFI is highly susceptible to expropriation:FDI involves control rights and therefore
foreign investors can engage in “defensive” acts to minimize expropriation risk. See
Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) for specific strategies that firms can use to decrease FDI
expropriation risk (e.g., if the firm is a monopolist, it can locate production in different
countries to drive the firm’s present value to zero if expropriation occurs). In contrast,
it is difficult for IFI investors to engage in defensive actions. They could add restrictive
covenants to deter expropriation, but these contracts are difficult to enforce. It is this
underlyingenforcement problemthat creates the expropriation risk, and may explain
the inability of some countries to attract IFI despite their relative success in attracting
FDI. For example, Nigeria ranks among the top 12 developing countries in terms of
FDI, with FDI increasing from about $400 million each year over the period 1981–
1985, to $723 million over the period 1986–1990, and to $1.1 billion over the period
1990–1994. Despite this significant rise in FDI, it receivedno IFI until 1994, when it
received a meager $17 million.
3. IFI is highly concentrated in geographic areas and countries:In 1996, 48% of bond
issues and loans to developing countries went to Latin America compared to 13%
for Europe and Central Asia and 4% for Sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that
country-specific factors are important (i.e., interest rates are not sufficient to determine
investment flows).
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4. IFI investment is volatile:The World Bank documents in Global Economic Prospects
that five East Asian countries shifted from a net inflow of $94 billion in 1996 to a net
outflow of−$6 billion in 1997 [cf., World Bank (1998b)]. This volatility is consistent
with the exponential structure ofβ.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines factors that determine a country’s ability to attract foreign pri-
vate investment when contractual enforcement is problematic. We find that when
enforcement is imperfect, a country’s fundamental characteristics affect its abil-
ity to borrow from abroad. By analyzing the incentive constraint that the country
faces, we derive two thresholds,β(r, kd) andβ∗(r, kd), that segment the unit inter-
val on which the “standard” discount factorβ(θ, r ) is defined into three disjoint
subintervals. These subintervals determine the optimal private investment flows.
The analysis effectively reduces the foreign investment problem to a comparison
of the country-specific discount factorβ(θ, r ) with each of the subintervals: If
β(θ, r ) ∈ (0,β), autarky occurs; ifβ(θ, r ) ∈ [β, β∗), investment is constrained;
and ifβ(θ, r ) ∈ [β∗, 1), investment is unconstrained optimal.
When private markets fail, some type of intervention is generally necessary and
desirable to correct the problem. Our results indicate that when the source of the
market failure is imperfect enforcement of contracts, there are at least two indirect
ways to address enforcement problems:
(i) Policy makers may try to alterβ(θ, r ) via three types of policies. First, the country
could take measures to raiseθ by altering the risk factors in Table 1. Second, lower
world interest rates will raiseβ for all countries, although no country can achieve
this unilaterally. Third, policies directed at altering the exponential structure ofβ in
Case 2 (see Figure 5) may reduce the volatility of private investment flows.
(ii) Policy makers may try to alter the critical thresholdsβ andβ∗ to enlarge the set
of Case 2 and 3 equilibria. In our simple model, this involves policies designed to
alter kd andr . However, Asiedu and Villamil (1999) build on this model to show
how policies often used by multilateral agencies (i.e., loan subsidies and technical
assistance) can be used to alter these thresholds.
The most direct way to solve problems that arise from imperfect contractual en-
forcement is obviously to improve the enforcement technology. Although some
progress has been made recently on implementing multilateral institutions (e.g.,
the WTO and the European Central Bank), the absence of a supranational legal
authority that can enforce contracts in an international setting remains an important
and difficult problem.
The indirect policies that we have characterized to improve private investment
flows appear to constitute a useful interim measure in the absence of a suprana-
tional authority. The simple structure of the model provides a useful theoretical
framework for additional policy analysis. In addition, the model provides an in-
teresting contrast to recent models of international capital flows based on infor-
mation asymmetries [e.g., Gertler and Rogoff (1990); Boyd and Smith (1997)].
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These alternative models have the feature that an ability to provide internal finance
mitigates an information friction. Wealthier economies have a superior ability to
finance investments internally and, as a consequence, international markets favor
these “richer” countries. In contrast, in our model a wealthier country experiences
less “pain” by being excluded from world capital markets than a poorer country.
Rich countries therefore have a greater incentive to default on debt than poorer
countries, ceteris paribus. These alternative predictions potentially present an in-
teresting empirical test of the models.
NOTES
1. Expropriation is the violation of any condition of an investment agreement. It may involve direct
government default on foreign investment contracts or guarantees, prevention of domestic residents
from honoring obligations to foreign creditors, and so on.
2. See Alvarez and Jermann (1998), Chatterjee and Corbae (1996), and Krasa and Villamil (2000)
for analysis of the impact of limited enforcement in other contexts.
3. We focus on the risk-neutral case to study the effect of “pure enforcement problems” on invest-
ment. Underinvestment would be even more severe if the host used international capital markets for
consumption insurance (i.e., if agents were risk averse). The model is related closely to that of Eaton
and Gersovitz (1983), although their focus is on taxation whereas ours is on the discount factor.
4. We provide measures ofθ andβ and determine their quantitative significance for private invest-
ment flows.
5. See Knack and Keefer (1995) for measures of the quality of political and legal institutions for
111 countries, which they use to assess the riskiness of investment using the same data set.
6. In real business-cycle models,β is calibrated from a nonstochastic version of the growth model
and data on the average experience of an economy over a particular period. The calibration typically
uses the equations1Kt+1/Kt andYt+1/Yt from the growth model.
7. The stock of financial assets in industrial countries is estimated to be $20 trillion, whereas capital
flows to developing countries are in the range of $120 billion [cf., Cline (1995)].
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider each case:
Case 1. WhenB(k) cutsG(k) atkd from below,B′(kd)<G′(kd) and the autarky equi-
librium occurs (see Figure 1). This implies thatβ f ′(kd) < r . Define
β(kd, r ) = r
f ′(kd)
.
Thenβ is the minimum discount factor required to attract foreign investment. Hence for
anyβ(θ, r ) ∈ (0,β), the inefficient autarky equilibrium occurs.
Case 2. Note thatβ >β implies thatB(k) cuts G(k) at kd from above. This implies
that there exists an upper boundk̄> kd such that the interval [kd, k̄] is self-enforcing. To
prove the result, it suffices to show thatk∗u 6∈ [kd, k̄] for β ∈ [β, β∗). If k∗u 6∈ [kd, k̄]; then
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equation (1) binds and the optimal self-enforcing investment plan isk∗c = k̄< k∗u. The result
follows becauseβ <β∗ implies thatk∗u is not self-enforcing; i.e.,k
∗
u 6∈ [kd, k̄].
We also show that 0<β < β∗ < 1. Note thatkd < k∗u implies that a straight line that
passes throughkd andk∗u cuts f (k) from above atk











The result follows from the inequalities.
Case 3. Substitutek = k∗u andr = f ′(k∗u) in equation (3) and defineβ∗ as











)− f (kd) .
Thenk∗u is self-enforcing if and only ifβ(θ, r ) ≥ β∗. Note thatβ∗ is the minimum discount
factor for whichk∗u is self-enforcing.















)− f (kd) .
Note that f ′′(k) < 0. Further, becauseβ < β∗, equation (4) implies thatβ∗ f ′(kd) > r .
The result follows immediately.










+ (k∗u − kd).




































)− [ f (k∗c)− f (kd)]dβdr
}
.
This is the Case-2 equilibrium whereB(k) cutsG(k) from above atkd and from below
at k∗c (see Figure 2). Hence,B
′(kd) < G′(kd) and B′(k∗c) > G
′(k∗c). This implies that
[β f ′(kd)− r ] > 0 and [β f ′(k∗c)− r ] < 0, and the result follows.
